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INCARNATION: A BUDDHIST VIEW] 
Jose Ignacio Cabezon 
As is the case with many of the more classically theistic religions, 
Mahayana Buddhism has attempted to elaborate doctrines of incarnation. 
This paper will first examine the philosophical/ doctrinal context in which 
such doctrines are elaborated by offering a brief overview of Buddhism's 
repudiation of theism. It then discusses both denaturalized / philosophical 
and naturalized/narrative versions of the doctrine of incarnation as it is 
found in both the exoteric and the tantric (esoteric) traditions of the 
Mahayana texts. It concludes with a defense of the coherence of the 
docetism found in such texts. 
I take it that one of the principal goal of this issue of Faith and Philosophy is 
to prod the contributors - especially the buddhologists - to use their com-
parative diving rods to identify (to dowse for) those "currents" (those, 
even if only crypto-, theistic streams) that lie beneath the dry surface of 
Buddhism's otherwise stalwart atheism. But why go divining for God on 
such barren ground as that represented by Buddhism? If the purpose of 
such an exercise, at least in part, is to broaden the horizons of the philoso-
phy of religion by inviting new partners into the conversation - a laudable 
goal- then focusing on theism would seem natural, especially since for the 
philosophy of religion this represents the familiar. But in choosing "theistic 
currents" as the locus of such a conversation, there also arises a problem. If 
the purpose of engaging the literature of other religious traditions in com-
parative philosophical conversation is, among other things, to challenge 
the presuppositions of the philosophy of religion as that discipline has 
developed in the West, is theism really the best starting point? Does it not, 
for example, reinforce the traditional theistic lmderpinnings of the philoso-
phy of religion, which, to such a great extent, has tended to equate the phi-
losophy of religion with the philosophy of the Abrahamic religions, and 
especially with the philosophy of Christianity? In choosing theism as the 
locus of such a conversation, then, we must be weary, lest we fall into 
thinking of this enterprise as an invitation to think in a mode that J. Z. 
Smith, paraphrasing Redfield, calls the "they are LIKE-US" form of cultur-
al comparison.2 In the logic of the more ethno- (or, perhaps more accurately 
theo-) centric versions of this mode of comparison, Buddhism's very 
admission into the conversation comes to depend upon its being a "reli-
gion," where being a religion is equated with having theistic currents (it 
must be LIKE-US). 
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That being said, as a comparativist I must admit that I do find intriguing 
the challenge of bringing Buddhism into conversation with the philosophy 
of religion, even when the stipulated locus of such a conversation carries 
with it the risk of reinforcing the presuppositions of the latter. In "dowsing 
for God" over Buddhism's rather barren landscape, I have chosen to focus 
on the issue of incarnation. Given the importance of this issue as a topic of 
philosophical and theological speculation in the West, it undoubtedly repre-
sents the familiar. Although my investigations will clearly show areas of 
overlap between Mahayana Buddhist and especially Christian theories of 
incarnation, profound, differences will also emerge. By paying close atten-
tion to such differences, it is my hope that this essay will take us beyond the 
naive "they are LIKE-US" mode of comparison to a more nuanced v·iew. 
Buddhism, of course, is not a single thing, and undoubtedly there are 
schools of Buddhism that do appear quite theistic.3 My own field of exper-
tise is Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, however, and here the theistic currents are 
much more difficult to come by. Given that this essay is devoted to explor-
ing incarnation as the site of a conversation between the Buddhist and 
Christian traditions, it may be useful to contextualize that discussion by 
first surveying the terrain, that is, by painting for you a picture .- albeit 
briefly and in broad strokes - of the difficulty of this more general task of 
dowsing for God on the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist landscape as a whole. 
Buddha is not God. A buddha did not create the lmiverse, either ex nihi-
10 or out of pre-existent matter, nor is a buddha responsible for the mainte-
nance and destruction of the cosmos. Buddhas do not create living beings. 
Indeed most Buddhists believe that sentient beings, and the cosmos they 
inhabit, have always existed - albeit in an infinite cycle of creation and 
destruction - thereby vitiating the need for a first cause, divine or other-
wise: In addition, omnipotence is ruled out for Buddhists as a quality of 
buddhas, or of any other being for that matter. No being can suspend the 
workings of karmic causality, nor can they liberate sentient beings from the 
cycle of suffering and rebirth (saIpsara), simply by wishing to do so. The 
pervasiveness of suffering in the world is seen by Buddhists as proof of the 
incoherence of the notion of an omnipotent being, at least when that being 
is simultaneously held to be compassionately motivated to end the suffer-
ing of others, and cognitively capable of understanding how to do so. 
While insistent on the fact that such properties (creatorship, omnipotence 
etc.) are never instantiated, however, the Buddhist sources seem unwilling 
to relegate the classical Gods of Hinduism (Brahma, Indra, ISvara, etc. -
and there is ample evidence to allow us to surmise that the Buddhist view 
of such deities would apply, mutatis mutandis, to other deities in other cul-
tures as well) to the status of mere figments of the imagination.s While will-
ing to grant the mere existence of Gods (deva), then, Buddhists consider 
their depiction by theists to be unrealistically maxima!." 
When their attributes are correctly assessed, such deities, Buddhists 
believe, will be seen to be limited (in regard to their love, power, knowl-
edge, lifespan, in regard to their transcendence of the cycle of rebirth, and 
especially in regard to their ability to help others to free themselves from 
suffering). They will especially be seen to be limited as compared with 
buddhas, who evince these various qualities in their highest possible mea-
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sure. Buddhas are therefore said to possess the wish, impartially, to make 
all others happy (love), and to liberate all beings equally from every form 
of suffering (compassion). Being possessed of/by the best of motivations, 
they are said to have the greatest possible ability to help others, especially as 
regards the achievement of buddhahood. Buddhas are the most effective 
teachers because their total knowledge (sarvajna) gives them access to, 
among other things, the minds of others, thus allowing them to craft the 
best strategies for spiritual intervention. Their transcendence of the cycle of 
rebirth gives them unfettered access to the entire universe of living beings, 
throughout all of space and time.? God(s) have none of these qualities, or at 
least none of them to the extent that Buddha(s) do.s To put the matter suc-
cinctly, God(s) are less than theists estimate, and buddhas more. 
For all of the ways in which a buddha is different from God, there are 
problems faced by Buddhist philosophers that resemble those faced by 
their more classically theistic colleagues. One constellation of problems 
arises as a result of the fact that Buddhism (or at least Mahavana 
Buddhism), like its more theistic counterparts, claims that not only inaxi-
mally perfect beings (that is, buddhas)," but human beings who have made 
substantial progress on the spiritual path (that is, arya bodhisttvas),1" mani-
fest or incarnate in the world for the benefit of others. It is the tension 
between buddhas' unchanging perfection and their "incarnate" existence 
in an imperfect world that gives rise to a series of philosophical/theologi-
cal conundrums that I will call the dilemma of incarnation. 
Incarnation as a topic of investigation across cultures is of course not 
unknown to the student of comparative religions. ll In its more, if not most, 
general form, the problem can be roughly circumscribed through questions 
of the following sort. Is the action of incarnating restricted to one unique 
being, or are there many beings who have this power? Can human beings 
gain such a power? Are thcre degrces of such a power? (Is incarnation a 
unique occurrence, or can a being incarnate multiply? Is there a limit to the 
possible number of incarnations a being can manifest?) Where does incar-
nation take place? (Only on the earth, or elsewhere as well?) Why would a 
being choose to incarnate in the world? Indeed, is it a matter of choice or 
necessity? Do perfect beings only incarnate in human form? Is the incarna-
tion of a perfect being also perfect (however that may be understood, i.e., 
as sinless, omniscient, omnicompassionate, etc.)? Is s/he pre-perfected, or 
does s/he incarnate as an imperfect being who then actualizes perfection 
while in the world? Is s/he fully human? (Does s/he have a body made of 
flesh, for example? How is her /his mind different, if at all, from that of an 
ordinary human being? Does s/he suffer?) How can the unchanging 
nature of perfection be reconciled with the messiness of history? Are the 
actions of an incarnation predetermined: necessitated, as it were, by the 
fact of her/his perfection, or by facts about the world (i.e., the needs of oth-
ers)? Or are they freely chosen, autonomous responses to historical contin-
gencies? What is the relationship (ontologically, epistemically) of an incar-
nation to the being that is her/his perfected basis/source!2? 
The answers given to these questions in many ways differentiates one 
religious tradition from another, but the diversity of views even within a 
single religion often leads to patterns of resemblance between schools of 
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thought across religions. Hence, at one end of the spectrum, we might 
place Christianity, with its view of the incarnation as a unique historical 
occurrence, and at the other, Mahayana Buddhism, with its notion that 
infinite number of buddhas have been "incarnating" in infinite forms (both 
human and nonhuman) throughout the universe since time beginningless. 
And yet, both within Christianity and Buddhism, we find a range of views 
that suggests patterns of resemblance across traditions. Hence, both in 
Christianity and in Buddhism, we find anthropocentric christ/buddh-olo-
gies, that view the being who incarnates in the world as strictly human, 
epitomized by the Arian, Ebionite and Hlnayana positions, respectively; 
and in both traditions, we find theo/buddho-centric ones, that consider 
such a being to be strictly divine, as in the Sabellian,'3 Docetic and 
Mahayana schools. In addition to the resemblances in doctrinal content, 
there are also resemblances in form. Hence, we find both in the Buddhist 
and Christian textual tradition a form of discourse on incarnation that is 
abstract, ahistorical, or, to resort to a Griffithsism,'4 denaturalized; ,md we 
also find, in each tradition, a more concrete historical, naturalized dis-
course on incarnatiol) that is tied to the specific person and life- (or lives-) 
history of Jesus and Sakyamuni Buddha. I now turn to these two forms of 
discourse, in the order just mentioned. 
The denaturalized form of discourse related to incarnation often con-
cerns itself with ontological and epistemological issues. Religious intellec-
tuals from a variety of traditions have often tended to focus on the ontolog-
ical dimension of this cluster of problems: on the essential nature of incar-
nations, and their relationship to their basis/source? Such, of course, is the 
preoccupation of the homo/homoi-ousias and related controversies in 
Christianity, and arguably the preoccupation of the three/four-body con-
troversy in Indian Mahayana Buddhism as well. ls The notion that buddhas 
have transcendent aspects that are accessible only to other buddhas, and 
more immanent ones, that are accessible more widely, is quite old. The 
doctrine is to be found in proto-Mahayana texts like the Mahavastu. It was 
systematized by Indian Buddhist philosophers/theologians, and further 
refined in the Tibetan scholastic tradition. '6 Since much of what follows 
requires at least a basic understanding of the Buddhist doctrine of the 
Buddha's bodies as systematized in this more abstract discourse,17 let me 
now summarize this doctrine briefly, relying principally on the lndo-
Tibetan literature. 
Buddhas have two principle types of "bodies" (kaya): transcendent 
"dharma-bodies" (dharmakaya)18 and more accessible "form bodies" 
(rupakaya). In both India and Tibet there was considerable controversy 
over whether the dharma-body was of one or two kinds. Those who 
claimed there were two believed that a buddha's perfection had two 
aspects: a negative one, that they claimed was the buddha's essential 
nature (svabhava), and that they identified with the emptiness of a bud-
dha's mind, and a positive one, that they identified with all of the buddha's 
positive qualities, especially his or her gnosis (jfiana).'9 Whether singular or 
dual, the dharma-body of a buddha was believed to be eternal, and 
beyond the perceptuaPO ken of even the most advanced bodhisattvas, and 
therefore directly perceivable only by another buddha. The form bodies, 
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however, are accessible. However, contrary to what the word form (rupa, 
gzugs) implies, both in English and in Sanskrit and Tibetan, these bodies 
are said to be material only in appearance, for in reality they are of the same 
substance or nature as a buddha's gnosis.21 The form bodies are of two 
kinds. (1) "The body enjoyed in community" or "enjoyment body" 
(salpbhogakaya)22 abides eternally (rtag du) in a special heavenly realm 
(adorned by all of the major and minor bodily marks of an enlightened 
being), can be perceived ("enjoyed") only by very advanced Uirya) bod-
hisattvas,2' and will remain until all beings are liberated from suffering. (2) 
The illusory manifestation body (nirmaI)akaya)/4 is multiple (of three gen-
eral types/5 but infinite in number). It exists in various realms of existence 
(on the earth,26 but also in other realms), and is more fully accessible to less 
spiritually mature beings.27 
Now for Buddhists the main issues were not what they were for their 
Christian counterparts. For example, Buddhists did not argue over 
whether the dharmakaya was of a same, a similar, or a different nature 
from the rupakayas. The scholars who dealt with such issues were clearly 
unanimous in their belief that all three of the buddha's bodies were of one 
nature. For example, all three are said to arise simultaneously (dus snyams 
du) when a bodhisattva attains enlightenment.2S Nothing in Mahayana doc-
trine calls for an explanation of how one person can have the natures of 
two distind types of being. When a buddha incarnates as a human being, 
that incarnation is human in appearance only. In reality, it is a buddha.'" 
For Buddhists there is no question that the categories human and buddha 
are mutually exclusive. Even though every buddha was a human being at 
one point in time, there is no attempt in the Buddhist sources to suggest 
that a being can simultaneously be both human and buddha. Additionally, 
since each body of the buddha is equally buddha, each is equally omni-
scient,'° so there is for Mahayanists no question - as there was and is for 
their Christian counterparts" - as to whether or how an incarnation has 
access to the thoughts and intentions of his or her basis/source?2 The ques-
tion of access is moot for Mahayanists since all of a particular buddha's 
bodies "share" the same omniscient mind. The point, of course, is that even 
if it can be agreed that Buddhist and Christian theologians were, broadly 
speaking, concerned with "incarnational" issues, and even if they engaged 
these issues in a denaturalized discursive fashion, it is clear that they were 
asking very different types of questions. 
What then were some of the questions confronted by Mahayana intellec-
tuals regarding incarnation? One of the most important had to do with the 
question of how buddhas, who enjoy an unchanging perfection in dhar-
makaya, can act in the world. It is clear that the Mahayana sources are 
committed to the view that budd has do not swerve or waver (ma gyos pa) 
from the transcendent dharmakaya state.33 On the one hand, the essential 
(svabhavika) aspect of the dharma-body, which is identified with empti-
ness (see above), is considered a permanent phenomenon, by which is 
meant that it is not momentary (skad cig ma ma yin pa). On the other 
hand, even the dharma-body in its gnostic (jilanatmaka) mode of subsis-
tence, though momentary (a corollary of its being gnosis, and therefore 
mind), is at each moment a state of equal perfection. How can a being that 
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exists in this way interact with, and be effective in, a changing world? TI1at 
buddhas are believed to be so is evident from a number of passages in the 
Mahayana texts, passages like this one from the Uttaratantra: 
The Great Compassionate One knows the world, 
And witnessing the world in its entirety, 
Without wavering from the dharma-body ... 
For as long as there is an existence, he manifests himself 
In the impure fields 
Using various magical devices.34 
The question of a buddha's simultaneous transcendence and imma-
nence has sometimes been framed in psychological terms. According to 
most of the Mahayana sources, buddhas lack conceptuality (mam par rtog 
pa). Their omniscient gnosis perceives the world directly (mngon sum du), 
and not conceptually, that is, not through the intermediary of images or 
words. 3s And yet action would seem to require motivation (kun slong), 
which by its very nature is concephtaL How then can buddhas act for the 
welfare of others if they lack the conceptual motivation to act? When bud-
dhas do act, they are said to do so effortlessly (bad thsol med par), that is, 
spontaneously (lhun gi grub par), without conceptual rumination, and 
without exertion. They do not first think to incarnate, or to teach, and then 
do so. Instead this happens spontaneously. But again, how is this possible? 
One of the more lucid explanations of this aspect of a buddha's conduct is 
found at the end of the Indian Buddhist classic, the Madhyamakavatlira. 
Whether concerning motivation or effort, the answer is the same: buddhas 
act, without wavering from the perfection embodied in their dharmakayas, 
through their previous training, and especially due to the power of their 
previous vow (made during their training as a bodhisattva) to seck the 
welfare of others. lt is this previous conditioning that allows, and indeed 
impels, them to act, even without conceptuality, once they achieve bud-
dhahood. Candrakirti (7th century), the author of the Madhyamaka'Tatfira, 
uses the following example: 
(6) Here [in the context of everyday experience], a potter's wheel is 
[initially] spun through the efforts of a strong potter. Once turning, 
though, it continues to spin even without the benefit of any addition-
al effort from the potter, and in fuis way it furnishes the cause for the 
production of jugs and other kinds of pottery. 
(7) Similarly, [the buddha] puts forth no effort whatsoever, as he 
abides in his body of the Dharma, and yet his totally inconce1vable 
deeds are accomplished through the virtue he acquired [previously] 
as a living being, and in particular through his vow [to lead allliv:ing 
beings to awakening].36 
Interesting as it would be to explore the Tibetan scholastic tradition on 
this and related issues, I forego this, and content myself to simply point out 
that, like the Christian scholars, both ancient and modern, who have dealt 
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with the issue of incarnation, Buddhists faced their own distinct problems, 
problems that were in most cases quite different from that of their 
Christian counterparts. 
But despite the very different nature of the questions and answers given 
by Buddhist and Christian theologians, these two traditions as discourses 
share much in common, as we have already mentioned. There is at the 
very least a substantial portion of the discourse on incarnation in both tra-
ditions that has these traits in common: (1) it is essentially dep~rsonalized 
(God/dharmakaya and son/rupakaya talk rather than }esus/Sakyamuni 
talk), (2) it is abstract and ahistorical (concerned with essences and knowl-
edge rather than with the depiction of specific episodes in the lives of 
incarnations), and (3) it is concerned fundamentally with ontological and 
epistemological issues. 
In contrast to this, there is, I believe, a more naturalized, contextual, his-
torical mode of confronting this dilemma, one that attempts to formulate a 
consistent picture of the doctrine of incarnation by reference to an actual 
historical figure and his journey in time. For now I leave open the broader 
comparative question of the extent to which this alternative, naturalized 
discursive mode is generally exemplified in other religious traditions (and 
in Christianity in particular). Instead, in what remains of this paper, I will 
show how at least one group of Buddhist intellectuals, in the later Tibetan 
tradition, does res?rt to such naturalized discourse focused on the "perfec-
tion history" of Sakyamuni as a way of (1) understanding the issues at 
stake, (2) cataloguing, doxographically, the various views that have been 
held on the issues, and (3) reconciling, to the extent that it is possible to do 
so, these various views. 
As in Christianity, Buddhism has seen its share of schisms. Latter day 
Buddhist theologians, especially in Tibet, sought to bring order to these 
schismatic developments through a variety of doctrinal means. One of the 
most important of these was the systematization of the Buddha's teachings 
into three vehicles (thcg pa gsum): (1) the lesser vehicle (theg sman, 
Hinayana), (2) the ordinary or exoteric greater vehicle (theg chen, 
Mahayana), that is, the vehicle of the perfections (phar phyin theg pa, 
Paramitayana), and (3) the extraordinary or esoteric greater vehicle of the 
Tantra (sangs ngags gi theg pa, Mantrayana). Tibetan Buddhist scholars 
went to great lengths to distinguish these three sets of teachings one from 
another, and to show the relative superiority of the latter to the former in 
each case. Hence, the three vehicles were distinguished one from another 
ethically (in terms of the vows taken). In addition, the Mahayana - that is, 
the perfection vehicle and the Tantra - were said to be superior to the less-
er vehicle because of their more extensive expositions of emptiness, and 
because of their unique emphasis on the cultivation of great compassion 
and altruism. Within the Mahayana, the Tantra was considered superior to 
the ordinary vehicle of the perfections because of its unique technologies of 
self-transformation, technologies that were said to speed up the process of 
human perfection. But in addition to distinguishing between the three 
vehicles in the ways just described, Buddhist scholars in Tibet claimed that 
the three vehicles could also be differentiated in terms of their views of 
buddhahood. We turn now to a subset of those discussions having to do 
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with the status of the historical Buddha. 
Put simply, the core question was this: was Sakyamuni, when he came 
to earth approximately 2500 years ago, a human being, or was he already 
enlightened? It should be mentioned at the outset that for the theologians 
who confronted the ques!ion this was not mere historical curiosity about 
the exact point at which Sakyamuni attained enlightenment, but a way of 
crafting a coherent position regarding incarnation. Tibetans answered the 
questi9n in the following way: the Hinayana believes that at the time of his 
birth Sakyamuni was a human being, the Paramitayana claims that he was 
an already enlightened being, and the Tantra contains both views, depend-
ing on the division of the Tantra being considered. As mentioned earlier, 
Buddhists never argued over whether someone could be both human and 
buddha simultaneously. Th~s was impossible by definition. But they did 
debate the question of when Sakyamuni made the tran~ition from human to 
Buddha, in particular debating the issue ~f whether Sakyamuni (or, more 
accurately, the being who would become Sakyamuni) was already enlight-
ened before he incarnated on the earth. Since the discussion that follows 
presumes an understanding of the Buddha's "twelve great deeds,"3s let me 
take this opportunity to list them here. They are: (1) descent from the heav-
en of Tu~ita, (2) conception, (3) birth, (4) skill in worldly arts, (5) enjoyment 
of his wives, (6) renunciation, (7) six years of ascetic practices, (8) taking his 
place under the bodhi tree, (9) defeat of the demon Mara, (10) enlighten-
ment, (11) teaching, (12) death. 
Let us now turn to the Tibetan sources to see how this controversy is 
played out. mKhas grub rje's (1385-1438) General Exposition of the Tantras 
(rGyud sde spyi rnam)'q is a useful point of departure because it begins 
precisely with a comparative treatment of "what the different vehicles say 
about how the Lord, the teacher, achieved complete enlightenment."4o 
Following the early Indian scholastic manual, the Abhidharmakosa, 
mKhas grub rje portrays the snivaka, that is, the Hinayana, position as 
maintaining that from the time of h}s birth as prince Siddhartha to just after 
his subduing of the demon Mara, Sakyamuni was "an ordinary bodhisatt-
va on the path of accumulation" (byang clmb sems dpa' so skye tshogs lam 
pa), which is to say that he was a hum~n being.41 After the defeat of Mara, 
during the last period of the night, Sakyamuni "immersed himself in 
equipoise, actualized the paths of preparation, seeing and meditation, and 
just at the point of dawn, entered the path of no l1}ore learning,. thus 
becoming a complete buddha."42 The doctrine that Sakyamuni came to 
earth as an ordinary human being, and that even after his enlightenment 
he continued to have an ordinary, material body, has theological (and even 
ritual) implications for many Hinayanists/' among them the fact that the 
buddha's earthly body is enmeshed with suffering, and is therefore not a 
true object of refuge. 
According to the exoteric (Paramitayana, perfection vehicle) form of the 
Mahayana, says mKhas grub rje, the historical buddha was enlightened 
even before his birth on the earth.44 Having traversed the various paths 
during three countless aeons of practice, he was bom as a tenth stage bod-
hisattva in a realm beyond the Akani~tha heaven called Ghanavyuha 
Akani~tha,45 where he attained complete enlightenment, and simultaneous-
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ly the dharma- and saTJIbhoga- kayas. And then, "while the saT11bhogakc'iya 
(the enjoyment body) resided in that (Ghanavyuha) Akani:;;tha, the 
nirmalJakaya (illusory manifestation body) play-acted (tsllUI ston) the 
twelve deeds in the world of human beings."46 These twelve deeds, that 
represent the paradigmatic life of a buddha are play-acted simultaneously 
in 100 myriads (bye ba phrag brgya) of worlds.47 Thus, according to the 
Perfection vehicle of the Mahayana, the historical Buddha who came to 
earth 2500 years ago - and according to some accounts, even the major 
players in the Buddha's life (his family and his chief disciples) - were all 
previously enlightened beings. The major events of the Buddha's life, 
according to this account, are predetermined in an intentional pattern 
scripted according to the needs of beings. (Hence, for example, a proto-
Mahayana text, the Mahavastu, speaks of the Buddha's body not as a flesh-
ly body, but as a body made of mind, and the Buddha's actions not as the 
actions of an ordinary worldly being, but as in "mere conformity" with the 
world.) At least in its broad outline, then, the Buddha's life is nomothetic. 
By eschewing the accidental and random character of his life, the 
Mahayana sources shun representing the Buddha's biography idiographi-
cally, as a series of unique, unrepeatable and contingent events. Put anoth-
er way, although the Buddha may have appeared to have been born, lived 
and died as do other human beings, these events, being neither karmically 
conditioned, nor accidental, do not have the same historical quality as the 
events in the life of ordinary beings. While appearing contingent to some, 
they are not truly so, being instead the pre-scripted acts of an illusory 
being. It is little wonder that Parrinder, in his Wilde Lectures, portrays this 
strand in Buddhist thought, present from the Mahavastu to the Lotus Sutra 
to the Tibetan sources, as docetic. 
Now in his discussion of the tantric view, mKhas grub rje states first 
that the account found in the two lower (kriya and carya, see note 36) 
Tantras concerning the process of enlightenment coincides with that of the 
ordinary Mahayana just presented. The view of the higher (yoga and anut-
tarayoga) Tantras, however, differs, and even the first of !hese, the Yoga 
Tantra view is two fold. According to the Yoga system of Sakyarnitra and 
BuddhaguJ:ya (two medieval Indian Buddhist scholars of the Yoga Tantra 
tradition), Sakyamuni was born on earth as a tenth stage bodhisattva. After 
his six years of ascetic practices (the seventh action), he entered a certain 
state of meditative equipoise, and while remaining in that state in his ordi-
nary material body (rnam smin gyi Ius), he traveled in a mental body (yid 
kyi Ius) in the person of the bodhisattva "Fulfilling-An-Aims" (Don thams 
cad grub pa) to the Akanii?tha heaven, where he was initiated into the Yoga 
Tantra and became enlightened as the saIJIbhogakaya Mahavairocana. 
After teaching the Yoga Tantras in this form, he returned to earth and once 
again entered the body he had left behind (mi yul du byon nas ... rnam 
smin gyi Ius de la slar zhugs te bzhengs), and then proceeded to act out the 
remainder of the classical events in his life (proceeding to the bodhi tree, 
the defeat of Mara, his enlightenment, teaching, and death)"" 
According to the alternative Yoga Tantra system of Anandagarbha, the 
tenth stage bodhisattva, in his last life, was born and enlightened in 
Akanii?tha, and only after this did he act out the twelve deeds in the world 
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of men. Anandagarbha's account thus resembles the ove~all pattern of the 
perfection vehicle. But the first account, tha~ of Sakyamitra and 
Buddhaguhya (SIB), present us with a new model: Sakyamuni, while born 
as a human being, leaves the earth for a period of time in a specially fabri-
cated "mental body" in order to achieve enlightenment. He then rehlrns to 
the earth to finish acting out the rest of the events of his life (the last five 
actions), now as a Buddha. This model in some ways bridges the Hlnayana 
and Paramitay~na theories. It recapitulates the Hi'nayana account by 
acknowledging Sakyamuni's status as a human being at least up to the end 
of the six years of ascetic practices. It recapitulates the Paramitayana 
accow1t by insisting on Akani$tha as the true site of the enlightenment, and 
on the play-acted quality of the last five of the Buddha's great deeds. Hence, 
the SIB Yoga Tantra view represents a kind of compromise position.''' 
The SIB account is interesting because it seeks to preserve at least a partial 
notion of history as empirical, in so far as the earlier portion of the Buddha's 
life is, as it appears to be, the life of a real hum~m being. At the same time, 
being a tantric view, it is forced to account for Sakyamuni's introduction to 
tantric practice, and for his subsequent enlightenment as a tantric deity 
(Mahavairocana). In keeping with the general commitn::ent to a view of the 
Tantra as a secret (guhya, gsang ba'l) vehicle, it explains Sakyamuni's "tantric-
ity" by constructing a secret history - that of the samadhi-interruphls and of 
the trip to Akani$tha in c; mental body - a history that, while not seeming to 
violate the integrity of Sakyamuni's life as it appears to ordinary mortals, 
nonetheless explains his achievement of enlightenment as a tantric deity. 
The Highest (anuttara) Yoga brand; of the Tantra offers yet a third (tantric) 
scenario to explain when and where Sakyamuni attained buddhahood. After 
three countless aeons on the exoteric Paramita path, he was born as a tenth-
stage bodhisattva in Akani$tha,SO receives the two higher tantric initiations, 
and achieves enlightenment as the tantric deity Vajradhara, the 
saIJ1bhogakayp. Then, while remaining in Akani$tha as Vajradhara, the 
nirmaI)akaya Sakyamuni manifests on the earth and acts-out the 12 deeds. 
After the seventh of those deeds (the six years of ascetic practices) Sakyamuni 
is awakened from meditation by the buddhas of the ten directions, proceeds 
to the bodhi tree and partakes of foods1 (the eighth deed). He is then given the 
two higher tantric initiations/2 and acts-out the attaimnent of enlightenment 
(the tenth action) according to the method of the Tantras in the human realm. 
The last two deeds (teaching and death) are then acted out accordingly. 
, The Highest Yoga tantric view hearkens back to the Paramitayana view. 
Sakyamuni is previously enlightened in Akani$tha, albeit tantrically, and 
appears on earth as an already perfectly enlightened being. The Highest Yoga 
tantric view also, however, invokes the samadhi-interruptus scenario of the SIB 
Yoga tantric ~nterpretation. But where the SIB account uses this as an opporhl-
nity to have Sakyamuni travel to Akani$tha, the Highest Yoga Tantra uses it as 
the occasion of Sakyamuni's breaking his fast ,and proceeding to the Bodhi tree. 
That is to say, whereas the SIB view requires Sakyamuni to make the journey to 
Akani$tha at this point so as to attain enlightenment, a journey that takes place 
through t~e secret-historical mode of a mental body, the previously enlightened 
stahlS of Sakyamuni in the Highest Yoga Tantra view makes such a journey 
unnecessary. Instead, the Highest Yoga Tantras takes this opportunity to bring 
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the secret of the Tantras to earth, to make it public, as it were, by having Sakya-
muni - albeit in play-acted form (since this had already occurred once and 
definitively in Akanif.'tha before his birth) - receive the higher initiations and 
achieve buddhahood tantrically while sitting under the bodhi tree. Thus, the 
Highest Yoga Tantr? presents us with two enlightenment scenarios: the real one 
that occurs before Sakyamuni incarnated on the earth, and the play-acted one 
that occurs o~ the earth. It differs from the other tantric accounts in its willing-
ness to have Sakyamuni act out the original (real) enlightenment scenario that 
took place in Akanif.'tha once again on the earth. As an aside, this is undoubted-
ly to bring home the unique doctrinal position - so central to the Highest Yoga 
Tantra - that enlightenment is possible even in the desire realm. 
~ I am not unaware of the complexity of the various accounts of 
Sakyamuni's perfection history that I have just outlined. I will forego further 
review of this material, which can, in any case, be found in a condensed form 
in Figure l. Instead, let me conclude now with some brief observations. 
Hina/Sravaka-yana 
Lesser velzide/vehicle of the Hearers 
Sakyamuni is human up to the time of his enligbtenment. dnd a buddba thereafter. First nine 
actions, those of a human being; last three, those of a buddha. 
Pciramitayiina 
Mahi'ivana 
CreaterVehide 
Exoteric Vehicle of the Perfections 
Sakyamuni enlightened before his birth on earth. 
All 12 actions those of a buddha 
Yogatantra 
System of5akyamitra and 
Buddhaguhya 
S;ikyamuni 1S bon, human; after 
six years of ascetic practices, \vhile 
in meditation, leaves his physical 
body and makes the trip to 
Akani~\ha in a spirit booy; 
recci\"es tantric initiation and 
bccOlnes enlightened as the 
salJ1bhogakiiya Mahavairocana in 
Akani$\ha; sends the (now enlight-
l'T1cd) spirit body to enter the 
phYsica I body of meditating 
Sakyamuni; as a (now secret) 
Buddha. he proceeds to Bodhi 
tree. defeats \1ora, play-aeh 
enlighternent, teaches and dies. 
First seven actions those of a 
human; last five those of a buddha 
System of Anandagarbha 
Similar to the Exoteric 
Mahayana vicw, except 
that the future Sakyamuni 
is enlightened as the 
salJ1bllOgakaya 
Mahavairocana, who then 
"sends" Sakvalnuni to thL' 
earth as a nirmaJ.1akilya. 
All 12 actions those of a 
buddha. 
Man tra/Tan tra-yana 
Esoteric V chicle 
Anuttara (Highest) 
Yogatantra 
The future Sakyamuni receives 
initiation and attains enlighten-
ment in Akani~tha as the 
salnbhogakaya Vajradhara; 
"sends" nirmal}ak,lya Sakyi.ll11Uni 
to earth; play-acts all twelve 
actions, inc1uding initiation and 
enlightenment. on carth. All 
tweke actions those of a buddha. 
Figure 1. Various \'iews of Sakyamuni's Enlightenment History 
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My main point, as you will recall, is that the discourse just described 
represents a naturalized, historicized, counterpart to the denaturalized dis-
course discussed above. Although kaya-ese is clearly present in this alter-
native discourse, its main purpose is not to resolve the dilemma of incarna-
tion by elaborating the ontological or epistemological relationships 
between the various bodies, but to, quite st~aightforwardly, set forth differ-
ent views of the enlightenment history of Sakyamuni. Although the genre 
is quite explicitly doxographical, th~ overall project is directed at reconcil-
ing the various views concerning Sakyamuni 's status as an incarnation. 
That reconciliation is perhaps not as clear in the text just discussed as it is 
in the later literature, where the "audience" for these various doctrines 
emerges as a variable in the discussion. The Tibetan literature (at least of 
the dGe lugs pa school) maintai;ts the Highest Yoga Tantra view to repre-
sent the definitive account of Sakyamuni 's enlightenment history. But 
rather than simply dismissing the other accounts as heresy, the hierarchy 
implicit in the Tibetan scheme allows for a valorization of the "lower" 
,;,iews in terms of their value for specific audiences. Hence, the view that 
Sakyamuni was born human is a view that cannot simply be repudiated or 
abandoned, since, being meaningful to the" ordinary disciples" (gdul bya 
thun mong ba) represented by t~e followers of the Hlnayana, it serves a 
useful purpose. The view that Sakyamuni was enlightened prior to his 
birth, however, is a doctrine of the extraordinary disciples (gdul bya thun 
mong ma yin pa) represented by the followers of the Paramitayana, Emd is 
therefore superior to the previous view. Viewed from the perspective of 
the Tantra, however, the Mahayana followers of the vehicle of the perfec-
tions become "common," and the tantric adepts "uncommon." Thus, the 
view that the various doctrines have different audiences - the position that 
these various views of incarnation serve useful functions for different types 
of individuals - allows for an appreciation of doctrinal diversity. Such an 
appreciation, however, does not devolve into relativism, for ultimately 
these various views are arranged hierarchically, and this implies that the 
Hinayana view is inferior to that of the Mahayana, and that the exoteric 
Mahayana view is inferior to that of the Tantra (and so forth within the 
division of the Tantra itself). 
But what makes the more human view of the Buddha inferior, and what 
makes those who believe it "ordinary"? A dogmatic - or worse, a circular-
argument, one that simply presumes the truth of the doxographical 
scheme, or of the scriptures on which it is based, will not of course be con-
vincing (even to a Buddhist public). So independent reasons must be forth-
coming, reasons for accepting one view of buddhahood over another. Such 
reasons are found in the texts, it seems to me, but ultimately they are rea-
sons based on experience: those who attain sufficiently high levels of medi-
tative accomplishment (for example, the "samadhi of the dharma stream," 
chos rgyun gi ting nge 'dzin) will be able to experience the t~uth of the 
higher view for themselves (for example, by seeing the young Sakyamuni 
not as a human being but as an already enlightened being). Reasons of this 
sort, though independent of the truth of the doxographical scheme, are pri-
vate, and therefore not convincing to those who have not attained these 
higher states of consciousness. Of course one might imagine more public 
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reasons: for example, pragmatic arguments concerning how and why the 
exalted view of the Buddha found in the Mahayana is more conducive to 
spiritual progress than the more human view found in the Hlnayana, but I 
am unaware of any such argument in the Buddhist sources themselves. Or 
again, one might imagine as an example of public reason~g an argument 
concerning how the Mahayana view explains aspects of Sakyamuni 's life 
that remain unexplained in the Hlnayana view. But once again, I know of 
no such arguments. In the end, then, we seem to be left with faith, rather 
than philosophy, as the basis for deciding between alternative views of 
buddhahood. But lest I be seen as giving up on philosophy too quickly, let 
me conclude with some comparative, and hopefully philosophically 
provocative, remarks. 
Conclusion 
Clearly, there must be some purpose to incarnating.51 In the Christian 
sources this has been variously identified. In some instances the Logos' 
incarnation in the world is seen as having a redemptive function. God's 
taking on a human form, and suffering as a human being, is seen as a sine 
qua 11011 to the salvation of human beings and the world. In other instances 
Jesus is seen as incarnating not God's nature (so that he becomes a two-
natured being, fully human and fully divine, the Chalcedonian christol-
ogy) but as, metaphorically, "incarnating" God's spirit. So that "God 
indwelt and motivated the spirit of Jesus in such a way that in him, 
uniquely, the relationship for which man was intended by his creator was 
fully realized."sl Hick, one of the chief advocates of this "inspirational 
christology," sees it not only as avoiding the essential flaws of the 
"Chakedonian-type christologies,"" but, in his version, as allowing for 
other incarnational possibilities, even in other religious traditions, which 
he sees as essential to any theology that takes seriously the challenge of 
pluralism. 
It should, however, be clear from the preceding discussions that 
Mahayana Buddhists will not find Hick's inspirational theology of incarna-
tion particularly appealing, even when graciously extended beyond the 
person of Jesus. For Hick's incarnation(s) are, alas, human, and it should be 
evident, even from the cursory treatment above, that for Mahayanists a 
buddha's incarnations - a buddha's form bodies, the enjoyment and illuso-
ry manifestation bodies - cannot be human. 
Now it might be argued at this point that the Mahayana doctrine of the 
Buddha's form bodies fails as a doctrine of incarnation, for, after all, accord-
ing to the Mahayana sources a buddha's form bodies are neither bodies, as 
conventionally understood, nor form, since they are nonmaterial. Why call 
these bodies at all, then? Why call this an incarnational theology? 
Mahayanists, who do themselves call these bodies (k5ya), are quite clear: 
the enjoyment and illusory manifestation bodies appear to be material bod-
ies. Hence, the illusory manifestation bodies of a buddha appear to be 
born, to grow old and to die. In the experiential field of ordinary beings 
(thun mong ba'i snang ngor), they are, for all intents and purposes, real 
bodies. That there are more spiritually mature beings, extraordinary 
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adepts (tlwn rnong rna yin pa'i dul bya), who see beyond the mere appear-
ances, and who recognize these as illusory, of course, does not belie the fact 
that for the vast majority of beings these illusory bodies appear and func-
tion as bodies, especially as regards their role as the purveyors of salvific 
doctrine, both through word and deed. 
But even if we grant the Mahayana doctrine of the form bodies of 3L bud-
dha the status of an incarnational theology, there still remains to discuss 
the adequacy of the Mahayana view as an incarnational theology. Here the 
main challenge, it seems to me, lies in whether or not docetism (the view 
that an incarnation is only apparently human) is defensible as a theory of 
incarnation. That Christians in the first few centuries of the common era 
did not find it so had to do, of course, with many of the other positions to 
which Christian theologians were committed (the doctrine of the redemp-
tive power of the suffering of the righteous, and the later notion that 
"Jesus, in his death, was our substitute in bearing God's just punishment, 
or otherwise appeasing the divine wrath or satisfying the divine justice, 
and so enabling a righteous creator to forgive his sinful creatures"57). Such 
doctrines required a Christ that, while ontologically linked to the father, 
was capable of suffering, and therefore fully human. But Buddhism, of 
course, is not committed to doctrines of this sort, making the docetic char-
acterization of the buddha's form bodies consistent with the Mahayana 
doctrinal framework as a whole. In fact, given Mahayana doctrinal presup-
positions concerning the nature of enlightenment - presuppositions that 
require buddhas to have transcended suffering altogether - it might even 
be argued that the docetic option is the only viable one. 
There is at least one other set of philosophical problems that docetists 
will have to confront, and this has to do with the nomothetic character of 
an incarnation's actions in the world. Recall that according to the above 
acco,!nts, all "supreme illusory manifestation bodies" (mchog gyi sprul skll), 
like Sakyamuni, have their lives scripted, at least in so far as they must all 
perform the same 12 actions. But how can the law-like, necessary quality of 
these actions be reconciled with the idiographic, contingent quality of his-
tory. How, for example, can a buddha be assured of a positive reception in 
the world? This is obviously a question that Mahayana theologians con-
fronted, although arguably not in these precise terms. Their answer can be 
pieced togetht;r from a variety of sources as follows. On the one hand, it is 
claimed that Sakyamuni, by virtue of his having accumulated merif" for 
three countless aeons, himself creates a historical situation - crafts an ambi-
ence - in which he will be able to perform the twelve actions unimpeded. 
This notion that buddhas create for themselves - and for those beings who, 
through their own virtuous conduct, manage to be reborn there - suitable 
"fields" of action (buddhak$etra, sangs rgyas kyi shing) is an old one in 
Mahayana Buddhism. It is a way of explaining not only how buddha:, can 
be assured a positive reception on earth, but also how they create more 
ethereal realms conducive to enlightenment (e.g., the pure lands = dag 
sizing, that are so important in Chinese and Japanese Buddhism).'Y 
On the other hand, the fact that Sakyamuni is not a real human being -
the fact that he is omniscient, and that, as an illusory manifestation, he can 
transcend the laws of the physical universe - means that he can avoid 
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many of the situations that would otherwise impede his prescribed actions 
(sickness, an untimely death, defeat in doctrinal di?putations or in magical 
competitions, and so forth). So, on the one hand, Sakyamuni prepares the 
world for his appearance; on the other, he prepares himself for it. 
When all is said and done, however, as long as human beings can exer-
cise free will, a position to which the Mahayana is deeply committed, there 
must still remain in the Buddha's interactions with others, and therefore in 
the life of the Buddha, a substantial flmount of historical uncertainty. But 
this is surely not incompatible with Sakyamuni's living out his quasi-nor-
mative life (N quasi-" because the Mahayana does not of course claim that 
even) action in the Buddha's life is predetermined). Hence, the Buddha may 
indeed face situations over which he has little, if any, control (jealous rivals, 
belligerent students, attempts on his life, and so forth). The Mahayana in no 
way denies this kind of historical contingency. At the same time, it does 
maintain that such uncertainty could not be so great as to impede the suc-
cessful completion of the 12 actions. Put another way, although there can be 
~ fair amount of contingency, the Mahayana is committed to the claim that 
Sakyamuni 's preparation (of the world and of himself) precludes there 
being so much uncertainty that his life in its broadest outline (as defined by 
the twelve actions) could be otherwise than what it was. 
Does this provide independent, public reasons for accepting the 
Mahayana account of the Buddha? No. But it provides at least some philo-
sophical defense of the consistency of docetism as subscribed to by 
Mahayanists. The plausibility of that doctrine - and arguably of every doc-
trine of incarnation - may in the end be a matter of faith rather than of phi-
losophy. 
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Bhavaviveka (6th century) speaks of gnosis-, form-, and speech-bodies. In this 
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account, the gnosis-body corresponds to the dharma-body, the form-body to 
the enjoyment and illusory manifestation bodies, and the speech-body to the 
"the speech that, based on that [form-body], possesses the 60 qualities, and 
that, having as its characteristic, the letters, roots and words, in that order (of 
increasing complexity), enraptures the minds of all sentient beings"; 
Bhavaviveka, Tarkajvi:llfi, ACIP, release Ill, TD3856E.RAW, folio 129b. 
18. One of the most vexing questions concerning a buddha's dharma-body 
has to do with whether it is singular or multiple. The claim that the dharma-
body of all of the buddhas is identical can be found in a variety of sources. 
Manv scholars - both Indian and Tibetan - believed, however, that such state-
menfs could not be taken literally. In this latter view, there are two senses in 
which every buddha, and their respective dharma-bodies, may be said to be 
"identical," or, more accurately, "equivalent": in so far as they have "the same" 
maximal attributes, and in so far as they have "the same" ultimate nature 
(emptiness). The fact that they share these qualities in common, however, does 
not imply that all of the buddhas, or their respective dharma-bodies, are one. 
Hence, in this view, neither Buddha X, nor the dharma-body of Buddha X is 
identical to Buddha Y and the dharma-body of Buddha Y. Put another way, it 
is not the case, according to this perspective, that all of the beings who attain 
enlightenment somehow meld into some kind of cosmic buddha-unity, there-
by loosing their individuality. While equally perfect, and equally empty, each 
retains an individuality that is the result of his or her particular history. What is 
more, their different histories makes different buddhas distinctively efficacious 
as regards their interactions with beings. Such a view can be found in a good 
deal of the Indian commentarialliterature; see, for example, the various com-
mentaries on MaiJiiYclnasmpgraila, sec. B3d, translated in Paul J. Griffiths, et. 
a!., The Realm of Awakening: Chapter Ten of Asanga's MahayanaSaIJlgraha (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 86-9. Griffiths, On Being Buddha, op.cit., 
pp. ]85-6, relying on the same Mahayanasmpgraha (among other) textual evi-
dence, however, opts for the identity-of-all-buddhas thesis, which again goes 
to show how ambivalent the Indian sources are on this issue. Tibetan exegetes 
also reject the claim that all buddhas have the same dharma-body, that is, that 
the dharma-bodies of different buddhas are identical in every respect. Tsong 
kha pa, for example, in his commentary on Madhyamakavatara (11, 39), argues 
that there are absurd consequences entailed by the identity thesis, see his dBu 
rna dgongs pa rab gsal, ACIP, release Ill, S5408E.RAW, folios 263a-b. 
19. Although Mahayana Buddhism and Gnosticism are dissimilar in many 
ways, the tendency of both to see the transcendent in both negative (Gnostics' 
characterization of God as "nothing," as "nonexistent," "unborn," "unbegot-
ten," "unknowable") and positive ("good," "absolutely good," "excellent") 
terms is a similarity that is at the very least worth pointing out; see Henry 
Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, vol. 1. (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 522-23., 
20. Both Indian and Tibetan scholastics, however, believed that the dhar-
ma-body could be cognized inferentially, and thus conceptually. 
21. Bhavaviveka, TarkajvaJa, ACIP, release Ill, TD3856E.RAW, folio 129b: 
"At the very instant his mind is enlightened, the Tathagata's body, which is of 
the nature of grzosis, arises in the palace of Akanif!tha as a result of having accu-
mulated infinite accumulations of merit and wisdom." (my emphasis) The 
same point is made by the Tibetan scholar mKhas grub rje, Dose, op. cit., p. 382: 
"the sa1Jlbhogakaya [is] ... inseparable in nature from the gnosis of the dhar-
makliya"; mKhas grub rje is also quite insistent there, as elsewhere, that the 
form bodies are not material. In fact, the Tibetan sources generally hold that a 
material body is forever lost considerably prior to the attainment of enlighten-
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ment (on the bodhisattva path). For an interesting discussion of the transfor-
mation of each of the aggregates (the body, the feelings, etc.) at the time of 
enlightenment see In.cl.nagarbha's commentary on the "Maitreya Chapter" of 
the Sa1p.dhinirmocana Sfztra, as translated by John Powers, Two Commentaries 
on the Samdhinirmocana-Slltra by Asanga and Jnanagarbha, Studies in Asian 
Thought and Religion, vol. 13 (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), pp. 
124-5. 
22. The sources are ambivalent concerning whether the sa1p.bhogakaya is 
singular or multiple, that is, concerning whether a single buddha can have 
more than one sa1p.bhogakaya. Those texts that claim a single heavenly realm 
(Akani~tha) as the unique abode of the sa1p.blwgakaya tend to the one-
sa1p.bhogakaya model. 
23. According to some Indian and Tibetan sources only 10th level bod-
hisattvas are capable of perceiving a sazpbhogak,jya; according to others, a 
variety of bodhisattvas on any of the ten stages possess such an ability. Hence, 
the eleventh century Indian scholar Atisa states in his autocommentary to the 
Bodhipathapradipa, ACIP, release III, TD3948E.RAW, folio 259a, "The dhar-
ma-body pervades all time and all things; the sa1p.bhogakclya abides in a ret-
inue, is only perceivable by the great lords of the tenth stage, and teaches only 
the profound and extensive doctrine of the Mahayana; the nirmaI)akaya is, like 
the udumbara flower (which lasts just a short time), a temporary thing (res 'ga' 
ba), for the scriptures state that after this aeon, there will be sixty aeons in 
which buddhas do not arise." But the Tibetan scholar mKhas grub bstan pa dar 
rgyas, Fhar phyin spyi don, chap. 8, Asian Classics Input Project (AClP), release 
III, SOO09E8.RAW, f. 9b and 21b-22a, holds the view that those who perceive 
the sa1p.bhogakaya need not be 10th level bodhisattvas, but only arya bod-
hisaW/as (that is, bodhisattvas on or above the 1st stage or bhfzml). Tsong kha 
pa, in his dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsa!, ACIP, release lIT, S5408E. RAW, folio 
255a, states that the sazpbhogakaya "directly appears" (dngos su snang ba) only 
to bodhisattvas who are devoid of mental proliferations, that is, "only to those, 
who, by virtue of their dual accumulations (of method and wisdom), have 
obtained the state of stainless mirror wisdom, and not to ordinary beings (so 
skye) who still possess mental proliferations." He then cites a verse that states 
that the sil1p.bhogakclya is perceived (but not exclusively?) by 10th level bod-
hisattvas. So Tsong kha pa's position is itself unclear in this regard. 
24. Griffiths, On Being Buddha, op. cit., chapter four, although equivocating 
at times (e.g., p. 197), generally holds to the position that the only properties of 
the illusory manifestation bodies of a buddha are relational ones, that is, tem-
porally indexed properties that exist only in so far as they appear to non-bud-
dhas ( of the form "seems to S to be P at t"). However, this flies in the face of 
doctrinal claims, elaborated most fully in the Tibetan sources, namely, that 
nonrelational properties (the uni-substantial nature of a nirmaI)akaya and a 
buddha's gnosis, the omniscience of a nirmalpkaya, on which see below, note 
29) enll be predicated of a buddha's illusory manifestation body. This, together 
with the critique of dharmakaya identity (see above, note 17), brings into ques-
tion many of Griffiths's conclusions concerning the consistency of the 
Mahayana theory of the Buddha's bodies (ibid., chapter seven). 
25. The three general types of nirmaI)akaya~, are (1) the supreme illusory 
manifestation body (nlchog gi sprul sku), like Sakyamuni, who acts out the 
twelve deeds of a buddha, (2) the body that, though originally born as, or man-
ifested by, a bodhisattva, comes to attain the status of a buddha's illusory man-
ifestation body after that bodhisattva attains enlightenment (skye ba'i sprul sku), 
and (3) the craftman-like illusory manifestation body (/120 /10 sprul sku), yvhich 
budd has manifest for specific, quite circumscribed, purposes, as when Sakya-
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muni manifested as a magnificent lute player to defeat a rival lute player, and 
thus to subdue his pride. mKhas grub bstan pa day rgyas, ACIP release III, 
S0009E8.RA W, f. 18a, cites a verse, purportedly from the Uttaratantra, as the 
source of this doctrine, but no such verse is to be found in that latter text. 
26. For the purposes of this paper I am translating the term Jall}budvlpa-
the name given by the Buddhist texts to the "continent" on which Sakyamuni 
manifested - as earth. Given that there may be no one-to-one correspondence 
between Buddhist and Western-scientific cosmology, I realize that earth may 
not be the most accurate translation, but this is for the most part irrelevant for 
what is to follow. 
27. There is controversy in the Tibetan sources concerning whether accessi-
bility to the nirmal,1akaya requires a certain level of karmic purity (las dag pal. 
mKhas grub bstan pa dar rgyas believes that it does not. Hence, he defines a 
nirmaI]akaya as "a form body that undertakes the very extensive (work) on 
behalf of others by way of actually appearing to ordinary beings, both to those 
who are karmically pure and to those who are not"; ACIP, release Ill, ibid, 
S0009E8.RAW, f. 18a. 
28. This would seem to contradict the claim, in some sources, that the 
sa1!lbhogakaya acts as the determinative causal condition (bdag rkyen) for the 
nirmaI]akaya. The Tibetan sources get around this problem by claiming that 
although the sa1Jlbhogakaya does indeed functiol) in this way in the case of 
some specific nirmaI]akayas (e.g., in the case of Sakyamuni, who arose as a 
nirmal,lakaya on earth considerably after he attained enlightenment), it cannot 
in general be maintained that these two bodies are related in this way (that is, 
with the sa1JlbllOgakaya as a cause of the nirmaI]akaya), since in general 
nirmJ1,1akayas begin to be emanated immediately upon the attainment of 
enlightenment, at the same time that the sa1Jlbhogakaya itself comes into 
being. Such a position is perhaps clearer for the Tibetan scholars than it is for 
their Indian counterparts. Consider, for example, Tsong kha pa's pains to gloss 
CandrakIrti's Autocommentary on MadhyamakavatJra (11, 10), ACIP release 
III, S5408E.RAW, folio 255 b, where he states, "Whether they arise from the 
power of the dhannakaya or of the previously explained riipakaya (i.e., the 
sa1JlbllOgakJya), nirmJI]akayas are, by nature, resultant bodies ('bras bu'i sku) 
that, being different from the saIl1bhogakaya, are causally conconcordant with 
the dharma- and sa1Jlbhoga-kayas. These (nirmal.1akayas), that arise as the result 
of (the need to) tame sentient beings, are said to have inconceivable qualities of 
power (mthu'i khyad par). Hence the Lord of Sages, in a single form body (i.e., in 
one nirmaI]akaya) that is causally concordant with the dlzllrma- and sal!1bhoga-
kayas, exhibits the entire range of his previous births, from the beginingless 
cycle (of existence) to the present, where they have now ceased. This is how in 
a single instant he spontaneously exhibits, clearly and without confusion, that 
is, without mixing it up, his entire history, the complete nexus of his past, like a 
reflection in an extremely clean mirror." 
29. This does not imply that an illusory manifestation body is less real than 
the Buddha's other bodies. The fact that all three bodies are of the same nature 
implies that there cannot be an ontologically hierarchical relationship between 
the three. Each is equally existent, and equally real. Put another way, the fact 
that an illusory manifestation body does not necessarily appear as a buddha 
does not mean that it does not exist as such. 
30. Not only is each body buddha, and each of the Buddha's mental events 
omniscience itself, indeed, every part of a buddha's body is also said to be 
omniscient. This follows, of course, from the fact that each of the buddha's 
bodies is of the same substance as his/her gnosis. Hence, the Co ne bla rna 
Grags pa bshad sgrub, in his commentary on the Diamond SOtra, ACIP, release 
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III, S0024F.RAW, folio 29b-30a, states, "Even the Buddha's sense conscious-
nesses, that is, the eye consciousness etc., perceive all phenomena. That is why 
they are explained as being no different from his actual omniscience. One satra 
[implies this when it says], 'Even the protuberance on the Buddha's head wit-
nessed it'; and in the section of the Recitation oj the Names [oj MaiijusrI] that 
speaks of his hair emitting vajras, it explains that every part of a buddha's body 
knows all phenomena. The Buddha's body and his sense consciousnesses are 
of the same nature as his mental consciousness (yid shes). The same point is 
made in the twenty-fifth chapter of the Cakrasawvara Root Tantra." 
31. In the Christian sources this was the issue at the heart of the monothe-
lite controversy. More recently, Hick has criticized the christology of Thomas 
V. Morris for its inability to go beyond monthelitism; see below, note 49. 
32. At the risk of oversimplification and overgeneralization, it might be 
useful simply to point out at this juncture - without further elaboration - that 
on the various issues discussed in this paragraph, Buddhists might be charac-
terized as at least partially sympathetic to many of the views of the figures and 
schools that came to be characterized by the orthodox Church Fathers as 
heretical: namely, Gnostics like Cerinthus and Simon, also Apollinaris, the 
Monenergists and Monotheletes, to name just a few. 
33. This may be an appropriate place to note that keno sis is neither 
required nor possible for buddhas. On the one hand, emptiness, as the intrinsic 
quality of all things (including buddhas), cannot be made to come and go. 
Buddhas cannot, for example, "swerve" from their empty nature (their svab-
havikakaya). On tlle other hand, such swerving is not required for the process of 
incarnation to take place. 
34. Uttaratantra (II, 53); Takasaki, op. cit., p. 329. 
35. The claim that a buddha's mind (a buddha's omniscience) is a form of 
direct perception (pratyak$a, 111ngol1 sum), and therefore non-conceptual, leads 
Griffitlls, On Being Buddha, op. cit., p. 193, to claim that buddhas possess "no 
conscious mental states," "no perceptual experience ... (no) affective experi-
ence." In the discussion that follows he implies that "what it's like to be a bud-
dha" is like "what it's like to be a rock"! "We know all that there is to know 
about what it's like to be Buddha precisely because there is nothing to know, 
and we can know that formal fact." (p. 192) But surely it does not follow that 
because buddhas do not cognize the world conceptually, they do not therefore 
cognize the world at all. It was in part to deal with this very issue that both the 
Indian and Tibetan scholastics resorted to the distinction between the two 
dharma-bodies: the Buddha's essential (svabhivika) body, i.e., the Buddha qua 
emptiness, and the Buddha's gnosis (jiianatmaka) body, i.e., the Buddha qua 
omniscient mind. It is true that the former cognizes nothing, but that does not 
imply that the latter does not. The Tibetan sources uphold the view that bud-
dhas possess "emotions" like love, compassion and the desire to benefit others 
(even if, both in quality and quantity, these emotions are quite different from 
our own). Hence, consider this passage from mKhas grub bstan pa dar rgyas, 
Phar phyin spyi don, chap. 1., ACIP, release III, S0009E1.RAW, folio 80a, where it 
glosses a verse from the Uttaratantra that describes the qualities of the Buddha 
as a jewel of refuge (the Buddha, says the Uttaratantra, is non-compounded, 
spontaneous, does not conceptualize things in dependence on other causes, 
which constitute the qualities of his having realized his own goal; and the 
Buddha possesses the qualities of knowledge, mercy and power, which consti-
tute the qualities that enable him to fulfill the goal of others). "Even though (in 
general) the Buddha jewel possesses all eight qualities (mentioned in the 
Uttaratlllltra), this does not mean that every (body) of the Buddha possesses all 
eight, since, for example, the svabhavikakaya does not possess the qualities of 
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knowledge and mercy, and the buddha's omniscience does not possess the 
quality of being compounded." It is by resorting to strategies like these that 
both the Indian and Tibetan sources uphold the view that Buddhas are cogni-
tive beings. 
36. Madhayamakavatara (11, 6-7). Translated by C. W. Huntington, Jr., 
with Geshe Namgyal Wangchen, The Emptiness of Emptiness: AI/Introduction to 
Early Indian Madhyamaka (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1989), pp. 
190-191. See also the comments of the Tibetan scholar Tsong kha pa on this 
guestion; ACIP, release III, S5408E.RAW, folios 253a-254a. 
37. The four major divisions of the Tantra, as systematized in Tibet, were: 
Action (kriya), Performance (carya), Yoga (yoga) and Highest Yoga (anuttarayo-
ga), where the latter is considered superior to the former in each case. 
38. This list varies from one source to another. Sometimes only nine deeds 
are mentioned, sometimes as many as fourteen, but the Tibetan sources, fol-
lowing the Uttaratantra, usually accept the following twelve-fold list as the 
standard one. 
39. The text (Toh. 5489) has been edited and translated by F. D. Lessir g and 
A. Wayman in Introduction to the Buddhist Tantrica Systems (Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass, 1978); reprint of the 1968 ed. In what follows, all references are to 
this edition of the text (abbrev. IBTS); all translations, however, are my own. 
40. IBTS, p. 16: theg pa ... tha dad pa ... lasl stOll pa bcom ldan 'das mngon par 
rdzogs par sangs r[.,ryas tshul gyi rnam par gzhags pal. 
41. IBTS, p. 18. 
42. IBTS, p. 18: gung La nmllam par bzhag pa'i tshel sbyor lam mthong larn sgom 
lam rnams nmgon du byasl tho rangs skya rengs dang po 'char ba tsam nal mi slob Lam 
mngoll du byas te mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas so/. 
43. This position is that of the Vaibha:;;ika school. The Sautrantika, another 
Hlnayana school, repudiates the Vaibha:;;ika claim by pointing out that if a 
Buddha's earthly body were not extraordinary, there would be no reason to 
consider it a heinous (anantarlya) offense to attack a Buddha's body and to 
make it bleed. See TBTS, p. 20, and J. 1. Cabez6n, Buddhism and Language: A 
Study of Illdo-Tibetan Scholasticism (A lbany: SUNY Press, 1994), p. 40. 
44. This point is reiterated in mKhas grub rje's sTong thun chen mo; see my 
translation, A Dose of Emptiness: All Annotated Translation of the sTong thun chen 
mo of mKhas grub dCe legs dpal bzang (Albany: State University of new York 
Press, 1992), p. 382. 
45. The Akani:;;tha being described here is said to be in the form reairn, that 
is, in the next higher realm beyond the desire realm where the earth is located. 
Tsong kha pa, in his dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal, ACIP, release III, S5408E.RAW, 
folio 249b-250a states, "[The text] teaches that all those who are not already 
buddhas must be inhabitants of Akani:;;tha when they first attain buddhahood, 
while those who have already achieved buddhahood, play-act the attainment 
of buddhahood in the desire realm. This is the view of the Paramitayana." 
46. IBTS, p. 22: longs spyod rdzogs pa'i sku de 'og min du bzugs lIasl sprul pa'i 
skus mi'i yul du dzad pa beu gnyis kyi tshul storz tel. 
47. For a discussion of this issue, and some attendant problems, see 
Griffiths et. aI., Realm, op. cit., pp. 251-58. 
48. Though there are obvious differences, I am struck here by the similarity 
of this (SIB Yoga Tantra) account to the account found in the gnosticism of 
Cerinthus, wherein Christ (= Holy Spirit) descends from his abode, the plcroma, 
into Jesus in the form of a dove after his baptism; see Wolfson, op. cit., p. 506. 
49. It should be noted that the SIB account diff~rs from the Hlnayana 
account not only in regard to the site (the where) of Sakyamuni's enlighten-
ment, but also in regard to the time (the when) and the method (the how) of his 
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enlightenment. Whereas the Hlnayana claims that Sakyamuni's enlightemnent 
occurs, as it seems to occur, after the defeat of Mara, the SIB account maintains 
that Sakyamuni's disembodied trip to Akanif?tha, and therefore his enlighten-
ment, occurs before the defeat of Mara. In addition, it occurs not through the 
traditional forms of meditation found in the exoteric sources, but through the 
process of tantric initiation and meditation. 
50. iBTS, p. 36: bskal pa grangs med gsum du tslwgs bsag pa'i mtharl sa beu pa la 
gnas pa'i byang chub sems dpa' srid pa tha ma par gyur pa'i tshe 'og min du mkha' 
khyab kyi ting nge 'dzin la snyoms par zhugs sol. Lessing and Wayman fail to 
translate the passage that staJes that this last life takes place in Akanif?tha. 
51. It is significant that Sakyamuni must take food before pro5=eeding fur-
ther. Since the tantric path is one that spurns bodily mortification, Sakyamuni's 
rejection of fasting as a path to nirva.1:ta is his first step in the pursuit of the path 
of pleasure as a means to enlightenment, one that will culminate several days 
later, according to this particular tantric account, in his taking recourse to sexu-
alyoga. 
52. mKhas grub rje does not state whether the defeat of Mara (the ninth 
deed) occurs before, during or after the initiations. 
53. The alternative would be to claim that God(s) and Buddha(s) act whim-
sically, without reason. This claim is not of course unknown in the history of 
religions, as when, for example, in some schools of Hinduism, the creation of 
the universe is said to be the mere play or sport (lIla) of God. 
54. Geoffrey Lampe, as cited in John Hick, "An Inspirational Christology," 
in Disputed Questions in Theology and the Philosophy of Religion (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1993), p. 53. Hick, it will be seen, rejects the claim of 
uniqueness. 
55. For Hick's critique of a contemporary version of such a christology, as 
offered by Thomas V. Morris in his The Logie of God Incanllltc, see "The Logic of 
God Incarnate," in John Hick, Disputed Questions (see previous note). 
56. This is so to the point where one is morally responsible for the actions that 
one engages in with respect to such bodies. Hence, someone who inflicts harm on 
a buddha's body and draws blood is said to accrue one of the worst forms of non-
virtuous (anantarfya) karma, the equivalent of patricide or matricide. 
57. John Hick, summarizing a view which he then goes on to criticize, in 
"An Inspirational Christology," op. cit., p. 41. 
5H. Specifically, it is said to be the training in the first five perfections - giv-
ing, moral discipline, effort, patience, and meditation - that brings about this 
result. Hence, Atisa, op. cit., folio 277b, states: "The Lord attained [the state of] 
non-abiding nirval)a; and it was by means of giving, etc., that he acquired the 
perfect result, his great environment, that is, his form body, his field, his 
entourage, and so forth." 
59. The Tibetan sources distinguish between the pure lands of 
nirma1J.akayas and those of sa1!lbllOgakiiyas. An example of the former is 
"Sukhavatl (the paradise of Amita.bha), in which (the Buddha) play acts his 
enlightenment as a ninna1J.akaya in an assembly composed strictly of beings 
who possess the five extra-sensory perceptions," while an example of the latter 
is "any field in which a buddha play-acts his enlightenment as a 
sa1!lbhogakilya, in an assembly composed exclusively of arya bodhisattvas"; 
mKhas grub bstan pa dar rgyas, Phar phyin spyi don, chap. 1, ACIP, release III, 
S00091E.RAW, folio 35a. On the controversy in China concerning whether 
Amitabha was a nirmii1J.akaya or Sill!lbhogakaya, see Julian Pas, Visions of 
SukhavatI: Shan Tno's Commentary all the Kuan Wu-Liang-Shou-Fo Ching 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), chap. 5. 
